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Clements: Juvenile Justice

SUMMARY

WILLIAMS v. GARCETTI: THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF HOLDING
PARENTS CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR THE
ACTS OF THEIR CHILDREN

1.

INTRODUCTION

Youth violence and crime are on the rise. l In an effort to
curb this increase in juvenile crime many states are taking
action,2 including television advertisements aimed at children;3 school education programs;4 and new laws directed at
parents. 5 By enacting new laws directed at parents, state legislatures are attempting to increase the responsibility of parents for the acts of their children and thereby decrease juvenile
crime. 6
Laws which hold parents liable for the acts of their chil-

1. Toni Weinstein, Note, Visiting the Sins of the Child on the Parent: The
Legality of Criminal Parental Liability Statutes, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 859 (1991).
2. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169·B:41 (1994), MO. ANN. STAT. §
568.050 (West Supp. 1994), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.41.1 (Anderson 1994),
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 530.060(1) (Baldwin 1984), N.Y. PENAL LAw § 260.10(2)
(West 1989), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14·316.1 (1993), ALA. CODE § 12·15·13 (Michie
Supp. 1994).
3. For Kid's Sake (NBC television commercial).
4. DARE, Drug Awareness Resistance Education. DARE is a school education
program aimed at elementary, junior high, and high school students which teaches
the students about the dangers and harmful effects of drugs. DARE.
5. See supra note 2.
6. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Davis, 368 N.E.2d 336, 337·38 (Ohio 1977). In
Liberty Mutual, the court noted that one purpose of parental liability laws is to
encourage continued parental supervision.
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dren are not a new development in California. 7 California has
already established the legal principle of parental tort liability.s Parental tort liability has been extended to require parents to reimburse schools for damage caused by their child's
criminal conduct. 9
This summary will examine California's effort to curb
youth violence through the amendment of Penal Code section
272.10 California Penal Code section 272 prohibits adults from
contributing to the delinquency of a minor.l1 The amended
portion of Penal Code section 272 mandates parents be held

7. CAL. CN. CODE § 1714.l(a) (West Supp. 1995). Section 1714.l(a) provides
in pertinent part: "Any act of willful misconduct of a minor which results in injury
or death to another person . . . shall be imputed to the parent or guardian having
custody and control of the minor . . . ."
8. [d.

9. See Curry v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 495 (Ct. App. 1993). In
Curry, the court held that the parents of a minor, who allegedly molested another

minor on school grounds, had to indemnify the school based on the parents negligent supervision of their child.
10. CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West Supp. 1995). The amended language of the
statute adds the statement, "a parent or legal guardian to any person under the
age of 18 years shall have the duty to exercise reasonable care, supervision, protection, and control over their minor child." [d.
11. CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West Supp. 1995) Entitled "Causing, encouraging
or contributing to delinquency of person under 18 years," provides:
Every person who commits any act or omits the performance of any duty, which act or omission causes or tends
to cause or encourage any person under the age of 18
years to come within the provisions of Section 300, 601,
or 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code or which act
or omission contributes thereto, or any person who, by
any act or omission, or by threats, commands, or persuasion, induces or endeavors to induce any person under the
age of 18 years or any ward or dependent child of the
juvenile court to fail or refuse to conform to a lawful
order of the juvenile court, or to do or to perform any act
or to follow any course of conduct or to so live as would
cause or manifestly tend to cause any such person to
become or to remain a person within the provisions of
Section 300, 601, or 602 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code, is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction
thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two
thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500), or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year, or by
both such fine and imprisonment in a county jail, or may
be released on probation for a period not exceeding five
years.
[d.
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criminally liable for failing to take reasonable care to protect
and control their children. 12
The application and enforcement of this new law has created an abundance of controversy.13 While many people feel
that Penal Code section 272, as amended, improperly focuses
on parents and thus is an inappropriate way to solve the problem of juvenile crime, others believe the converse is true,
namely that it is necessary to place more of the burden of
deterring juvenile crime on parents. 14
As a result of the controversy surrounding Penal Code

section 272, the American Civil Liberties Union (hereinafter
"ACLU") brought suit on behalf of the taxpayers of Los Angeles
County alleging that the amended statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and violated a parent's right to
privacy. 15 In Williams v. Garcetti, the California Supreme
Court unanimously upheld the validity of Penal Code section
272.16
The first section of this summary will explain the factual
background and procedural history of Williams v. Garcetti.
The second section will examine the legislative history of the
amended penal code. The final section will discuss the California Supreme Court's reasoning and holding.

12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West Supp. 1995) (as amended).
13. See Court Voids Crime Law That Aimed at Parents, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23,
1991, at A12; see also Claire Safran, Is it a crime to be a bad parent? Holding
parents responsible for their children's delinquency & crimes, WOMEN'S DAY, May
1, 1990, at 64.; Alma E. Hill, Crime Doesn't Wear a Watch, NEWSDAY, April 30,
1992, at 118; Richard Whitmire, American Trends - Parents Held Accountable for
Juvenile Crime, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 30, 1991; Nick Cohen, Climbdown
Over Fines for Parents of Offenders, THE INDEPENDENT, May 11, 1991, at 3.
14. Whitmire, supra note 13. The article lays out the various viewpoints surrounding parental criminal liability laws. One commentator thought the new laws
were emerging due to the belief that no one is taking responsibility to rear their
children.
15. Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507, 508-9 (Cal. 1993) (per Mosk, J., the
other panel members were Lucas, C.J., Panelli, J., Kennard. J., Arabian, J.,
Baxter, J., and George, J.).
16. [d. at 517.
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Ms. Gloria Williams was the first parent to be arrested
and prosecuted under amended Penal Code section 272.17 Ms.
Williams was the mother of a 17 year old boy suspected in a
gang rape. 1S Ms. Williams was arrested when the police found
a "gang museum" in her apartment which consisted of graffiti
on the walls, a photo album of family members holding guns
and making gang signals, and a picture of an eight year-old's
birthday cake with the child's gang name written in blue
icing. 19
Ms. Williams was released from jail after she obtained a
certificate showing she had graduated from a parenting
class. 20 The charges against Ms. Williams were subsequently
dismissed. 21 Nevertheless, parents feared that enforcement of
Penal Code section 272 placed them at similar risk of prosecution. 22 Thus, the taxpayers of Los Angeles County, outraged
over the arrest of Ms. Williams, challenged the constitutionality of the amended section 272 alleging that the amended statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and violated a
parent's right to privacy.23
The ACLU brought suit on behalf of the taxpayers of Los
Angeles County alleging that the amended Penal Code consti-

17. Claire Safran, Is it a crime to be a bad parent? Holding parents responsible for their children's delinquency & crime. WOMEN'S DAY. May 1. 1990. at 65.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 64. Ms. Williams had also taken her son for some counseling which
is provided for under the Parental Diversion Program. See CAL. PENAL CODE §
1001.70 (West Supp. 1995). The Parental Diversion Program was established in
continuity with section 272. Under the Parental Diversion Program the local prosecutor has the authority to review any prosecutions under Penal Code section 272
and establish a diversion program for the accused. Successful completion of the
program will result in dismissal of the charges for violating Penal Code section
272.
21. Court Rejects 'Gang Mom' Law. THE COURIER JOURNAL. Dec. 22, 1991. at
18A.
. 22. See Toni Weinstein. Note. Visiting the Sins of the Child on the Parent: The
Legality of Criminal Parental Liability Statutes. 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 859. 860
(1991).
23. Williams v. Reiner. 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 472 (Ct. App. 1991). reu'd sub nom.
Williams v. Garcetti. 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993).
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tuted public waste because it was unconstitutionally vague,
overbroad, and violated the taxpayers' right to privacy under
the Fourteenth Amendment. 24 After both parties filed motions
for summary judgment, the trial court entered summary judgment for the defendant, the State of California, concluding that
the statute was neither unconstitutionally vague nor
overbroad. 25
The ACLU appealed the trial court's grant of defendant's
motion for summary judgment. 26 The court of appeal reversed
on the grounds that the amendment was "impermissibly vague
and incapable of being uniformly enforced or applied by law
enforcement agencies and courtS.'127 The court of appeal found
that the amendment criminalized parental conduct without
establishing a standard by which cour.ts and law enforcement
agencies could determine what constitutes reasonable care. 28
The court did not address the issue of overbreadth because it
found the amendment unconstitutionally vague. 29
The court of appeal ordered the trial court to enter summary judgment for the plaintiffs. 3o The defendants appealed
the court of appeals judgment to the California Supreme Court
contending that amended section 272 is neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad. 31

III. BACKGROUND
In 1988, in an effort to control violent criminal street
gangs, the California State Legislature passed Senate Bill 1555

24. Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507, 509 (Cal. 1993).
25. Williams v. Reiner, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 472, 479 (Ct. App. 1991), rev'd sub
nom. Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993). The trial court held that the
duties referred to in the amended penal section 272 are "articulated in language
familiar and widely used in the law." Id. at 479.
26. Reiner, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 479.
27. Id. at 488.
28. Id. at 483. The court reasoned that, "the amendment leaves too much
room for abuse and mischief in its enforcement because any law enforcement agency is free to decide, based on purely subjective factors, whether the parents exercised reasonable control and supervision over their child." Id.
29. Id. at 488.
30. Id.
31. See Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993).
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(hereinafter "SB 1555").32 A major portion of SB 1555 consisted of the Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act,
which sought to reduce juvenile crime by increasing the penalty for an adult who used violent coercion to enlist a minor into
a street gang. 33 SB 1555 also amended section 272 of the California Penal Code, which prohibited the causing, encouraging,
or contributing to the delinquency of a minor.34
The amendment to Penal Code section 272 provided that
parents may be found guilty of a misdemeanor for failing. to
exercise reasonable care and control over their children. 3s Under amended Penal Code section 272, conviction is punishable
by a fine not to exceed two thousand five hundred dollars, or
by imprisonment for not more than one year in the county jail,
or both. 36 The amended statute further provided that a parent
may have the charges dismissed by seeking education, treatment, or rehabilitation under the Parental Diversion Program. 37
IV. COURT'S ANALYSIS
The California Supreme Court granted defendant's petition for review on April 3, 1992.38 The supreme court unanimously reversed the court of appeal and found the amendment
to be constitutionally valid. 39 The supreme court held that the
amendment was not impermissibly vague because it incorporated definitions and limits of parental duties that had long
been a part of California tort law. 40 The California Supreme

32. 11 S.B. 1555, 97th Cong., Reg. Sess. § 186.20 (1988).
33. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.26 (West Supp. 1995). This statute is the Street
Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act which targets adults by holding them
criminally liable for any action coercing a person under 18 years of age to actively
participate in any criminal street gang.
34. CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West Supp. 1995).
35. Id. The amended language reads: "a parent or legal guardian to any person under the age of 18 years shall have the duty to exercise reasonable care,
supervision, protection, and control over their minor child." Id.
36. Id.
37. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1001.70 (West Supp. 1995).
38. Williams v. Reiner, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 472, 479 (Ct. App. 1991), rev'd Bub
nom. Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993).
39. Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507, 517 (Cal. 1993).
40. Id. at 514.
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Court also held that the amendment was not overbroad. 41

A. VAGUENESS
The United States Constitution and the California Constitution mandate that laws may not be impermissibly vague. 42
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part that no person be deprived of "life,
liberty, or property without due process of the law."43 A law
violates due process if it is so vague that it does not provide a
standard of conduct for those whose activities are proscribed,
and if it does not provide a standard for police enforcement
and ascertainment of guilt. 44 In Kolender v. Lawson,45 the
United States Supreme Court stated that the void-for-vagueness doctrine required that a penal statute must define the
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness so that ordinary
people could understand what conduct was prohibited, and
must not involve arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 46
In Walker v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court
adopted the United States Supreme Court's definition of
vagueness. 47 The court maintained that laws must provide
people with fair notice of which acts are prohibited. 48 The
41. 1d. at 517.
42. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XN; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7; see also
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d
852 (Cal. 1988); see generally, Amsterdam, The Void·for·Vagueness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960).
43. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
44. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357; see also Walker, 763 P.2d 852.
45. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983). In Kolender, a California statute
which required people who loitered or wandered on the streets to identify themselves and to account for their presence when requested by a peace officer, was
found unconstitutionally vague. 1d. at 361. The Court held that the statute promoted arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement because it vested virtually complete discretion in the hands of the police to determine whether the suspect has
satisfied the identification requirement and should be permitted to go on his way.
1d.
46. 1d. at 357.
47. See Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1988). In Walker, a
mother was charged with involuntary manslaughter and felony child· endangerment
of her four-year-old daughter from acute meningitis after the mother provided the
child with spiritual treatment in lieu of medical care. 1d. at 871-73. The court
found that relevant statute did not infringe upon due process by failing to provide
notice of illegal conduct. 1d.
48. See Walker, 763 P.2d at 872-73. The court held that the statute at issue
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court further stated that in order to satisfy the requirement of
fair notice courts must first look to the language of the statute,
then to its legislative history, and finally to decisions construing the statutory language. 49
The Garcetti court noted that the starting point of a
vagueness analysis is the "strong presumption that legislative
enactments must be upheld unless their unconstitutionality
clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears.,,50 A statute
may not be held void for uncertainty if any reasonable and
practical construction can be given to its language. 51
The court next examined whether the amendment altered
or clarified Penal Code section 272.52 The court first looked to
the legislative purpose behind the amendment. 53 Viewed in
the context of the Street Terrorism and Enforcement Act, the
court stated that it appeared the amendment intended to enlist
parents as active participants in the effort to eradicate
gangs. 54 The court found it unnecessary to decide if the
amendment clarified or changed the existing Penal Code section 272 because the only relevant question was whether the
language of the amendment was sufficiently certain. 55
provided "constitutionally sufficient notice to the mother that the prOViSion of
prayer alone to her daughter would be accommodated only insofar as the child
was not threatened with serious physical harm or illness." [d. at 873.
49. Walker, 763 P.2d at 872 (providing that there is a strong presumption that
legislative enactments must be upheld unless their unconstitutionality clearly,
positively, and unmistakably appears). See also, Pryor v. Municipal Court, 599
P.2d 636 (Cal. 1979); Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court, 171 P.2d 21 (Cal.
1946).
50. Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507, 509 (Cal. 1993).
51. [d. (citing Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 845 (Cal. 1988)).
52. [d. at 510-11. The ACLU contended that the amendment changed the law
by creating a new, impermissibly vague parental duty as a basis for criminal lia·
bility. Defendants contended that the amendment merely clarified the statute's
application to an existing parental duty. [d at 509-10.
53. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 510. The Legislature enacted the amendment and the
related Parental Diversion Program as part of the Street Terrorism Enforcement
and Prevention Act. The court stated that the STEP act was premised on the fact
that "California is in a state of crisis which has been caused by violent street
gangs whose members threaten, terrorize, and commit a multitude of crimes
against the peaceful citizens of their neighborhoods." [d. See CAL. PENAL CODE §
186.26 (West Supp. 1995).
54. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 510.
55. [d. at 510-11. The court did not state why it was unnecessary to decide if
the amendment clarified or changed the existing § 272. The court held that the
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Notice

The court noted that the ACLU did not dispute the existence of a parental duty to exercise reasonable care and supervision of their children. 56 Thus, the court confined its analysis

relevant inquiry was whether a parental duty of "reasonable care, SUpel'V1S10n,
protection, and control" is sufficiently certain to withstand a vagueness challenge.
Id. at 511.
56. Id. at 511. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West Supp. 1995). The pertinent
part of the statute provides, "[e)very person who commits any act or omits the
performance of any duty, which act or omission causes or tends to cause or encourage any person under the age of 18 years to come within the provisions of
Section 300, 601, or 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code ... is guilty of a
misdemeanor . . . ." See also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1995).
This code section contains a lengthy list of conditions under which a minor can be
removed from the custody of a parent and declared a dependent child of the court.
These conditions include:
(a) The minor has suffered . . . serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the minor by the minor's
parent or guardian . . . . (b) The minor has suffered . . .
serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure
or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately
supervise or protect the minor . . . (c) The minor is suffering serious emotional damage . . . as a result of the
conduct of the parent or guardian . . . (d) The minor has
been sexually abused . . . by his or her parent or guardian or a member of his or her household . . . (e) The
minor is under the age of five and has suffered severe
physical abuse by a parent, or by any person known by
the parent, if the parent knew or reasonably should have
known that the person was physically abusing the minor . . . . (g) The minor has been left without any provision for support . . . (i) The minor has been subjected to
an act or acts of cruelty by the parent or guardian or a
member of his or her household . . . .
Id.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 601 (West Supp. 1995) states:
(a) Any person under the age of 18 years who persistently
or habitually refuses to obey the reasonable and proper
orders or directions of his or her parents, guardian, or
custodian, or who is beyond the control of that person, or
who is under the age of 18 years when he violated any
ordinance of any city or county of this state establishing
a curfew based solely on age is within the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court which may adjudge the minor to be a
ward of the court. (b) If a minor has four or more truancies within one school year as defined by Section 48260 of
the Education Code or a school attendance review board
or probation officer determines that the available public
and private services are insufficient or inappropriate to
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to the meaning of the terms "supervision and control."57 The
court analyzed the terms "supervision and control" in the context of the California Welfare and Institutions Code sections
601 and 602.58 The court noted that sections 601 and 602 apply to delinquent behavior. 59 Thus, the court reasoned that
under the amendment parents are liable only when they fail to
perform a duty of supervision and control, and omission of that
duty results in their child's delinquency.60
The court next analyzed the terms "supervision and control" in the context of California tort law. 61 The court stated
correct the habitual truancy of the minor, or to correct
the minor's persistent or habitual refusal to obey the
reasonable and proper orders or directions of school authorities, or if the minor fails to respond to directives of a
school attendance review board or probation officer or to
services provided, the minor is then within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge the minor to
be a ward of the court. However, it is the intent of the
Legislature that no minor who is adjudged a ward of the
court pursuant solely to this subdivision shall by removed
from the custody of the parent or guardian except during
school hours,

Id.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West 1988) states:
Any person who is under the age of 18 years when he
violates any law of this state or of the United States or
any ordinance of any city or county of this state defining
crime other than an ordinance establishing a curfew based
solely on age, is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court, which may adjudge such person to be a ward of
the court.
Id.
57. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 511. The court's analysis regarding the terms "supervision and control" is in the context of the Welfare and Institutions Code sections 601 and 602 and as defined by traditional notions of tort law. See supra
note 56 (for relevant text of the statutes).
58. See supra note 56 for the text of CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 601, 602.
59. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 511.
60. Id.
61. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 511-12. Parents have long had a duty to supervise
and control their children under California tort law. See, e.g., Singer v. Marx, 301
P.2d 440 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956). Singer involved an action against a 9-year-old boy
and his parents for damages for personal injury resulting from a rock thrown by
the boy. The court held that the parent "has a special power of control over the
conduct of the child, which he is under a duty to exercise reasonably for the protection of others." Id. Thus, a parent may become liable for an injury caused by
the child where the parent's negligence made it possible for the child to cause
the injury complained of, and probable that it would do so. [d. at 448.
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that parents have long had a duty to supervise and control
their children under California tort law. Thus, in amending
Penal Code section 272, the legislature was not imposing a
new duty on parents, rather it was incorporating the definition
and limits of a traditional tort duty.62
The court indicated that the scope of this tort duty was
defined by the Restatement of Torts section 316. 63 According
to the Restatement, there exists a special relationship between
parent and child which creates a duty in the parent to exercise
reasonable care to control the minor.54 Accordingly, the court
found that the terms "supervision and control" were consistent
with the definitions and limits of the parental duty established
in California tort law. 65
The court, combining its analysis of the Welfare and Institutions Code sections 601 and 602 with its analysis of the tort
duty, concluded that the terms "supervision and control" "describe the duty of reasonable restraint of, and discipline for, a
child's delinquent acts by parents who know or should know
that their child is at risk of delinquency and that they are able
to control the child.,,66

62. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 512. California is not the first state to adopt notions
of tort law and hold parents criminally liable for the acts of their children. See,
e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-701 (1988 & Supp. 1990). Colorado enacted the first
version of its present law holding parents criminally liable for juvenile delinquency
in 1903. For a further discussion of other state statutes which prohibit parents
from contributing to the delinquency of a minor see Kathryn J. Parsley, Note,
Constitutional Limitations on State Power to Hold Parents Criminally Liable for
the Delinquent Acts of Their Children, Note, 44 VAND. L. REV. 441, 446 (1991).
63. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 512. There exists a:
special relationship between parent and child and accordingly places upon the parent a duty to exercise reasonable
care so to control his minor child as to prevent it from
intentionally harming others or from so conducting itself
as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them,
if the parent (a) knows or has reason to know that he
has the ability to control his child, and (b) knows' or
should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (1993).
64. See RES'rATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (1993).
65. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 512.
66. ld.
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While the court noted that neither the amendment nor
prior case law set forth specific acts that a parent must perform, it concluded that this did not affect the clarity of the
duty of supervision and control. 67 Rather, the court asserted
that the lack of specificity was inevitable and desirable because it would be impossible to provide a statutory definition
of reasonable supervision and control. 68 By defining what a
parent may not do, the amendment permits flexibility, and
provides "reasonableness" as a guide for parents. 69
The court next analyzed the criminal negligence requirement of the statute. 70 Because section 272 is a penal statute,
parents must be criminally negligent in order to be liable under the statute. 71 The court thus held that the amendment
imposed criminal liability only when parents were criminally
negligent in breaching their duty of supervision and control. 72
The established rule regarding criminal negligence is that
67. ld at 512-13. The court noted that in dependency cases terms similar to
"supervision and control" have withstood challenge of vagueness grounds even
though few cases have attempted to define proper parental care or control. ld. See
In re J.T., 115 Cal. Rptr. 553 (Ct. App. 1974) (holding that a statute authorizing
any person under the age of 18 years to be adjudged a dependent child of the
court "who is in need of proper and effective parental care or control and has no
parent or guardian" was not unconstitutionally vague).
68. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 513. See, e.g., Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931) (stating that the concept of reasonableness serves
as a guide for law-abiding parents who wish to comply with the statute).
69. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 513. The court stated that unlike the statute involved
in Kolender, the amendment was not susceptible to interpretation in an "apt sentence or two." ld. The court also stated that statutes are not automatically invalidated as vague simply because it is difficult to determine if marginal offenses fall
within the statute's language. ld.
70. ld. at 513.
n. See Williams v. Reiner, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 472 (Ct. App. 1991), rev'd sub
nom. Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993). See also, CAL. PENAL CODE §
20 (West 1988) providing: "[i)n every crime or public offense there must exist a
union, or joint operation of act and intent, or criminal negligence;" CAL. PENAL
CODE § 26 (West 1988) which provides in pertinent part that one is not capable of
committing a crime "who committed the act or made the omission charged under
an ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal intent." Taken together, the court of appeals concluded that section 272 required an "intentional or
grossly negligent failure to exercise due diligence in the performance of a known
official duty." ld.
72. See Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 513. The court stated that the requirement of
criminal negligence arises from Penal Code § 20 and the Legislature's use of the
term "reasonable" in the amendment which denotes criminal negligence. See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 20 (West 1988).
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"ordinary negligence sufficient for recovery in a civil action will
not suffice; to constitute a criminal act the defendant's conduct
must go beyond that required for civil liability and must
amount to a gross or culpable departure from the required
standard of care.,,73 The court reasoned that amended Penal
Code section 272 thus punishes only negligence that exceeds
ordinary civil negligence. 74 A parent would therefore have to
make a gross and culpable departure from the duty set forth in
the amendment, to be held criminally liable. 75 The court reasoned that the heightened requirements of criminal negligence
alleviate any uncertainty as to what constitutes reasonable
supervision or control. 76
In addition, the court stated that there can be no criminal
negligence without actual or constructive knowledge of the
risk. 77 The court compared the knowledge requirement of
amended Penal Code section 272 with that for involuntary
manslaughter, which mandates that the act must be one which
has "knowable and apparent potentialities for resulting death
or great bodily injury."78 The court concluded that Penal Code
section 272 as amended punishes only parents who knew or
reasonably should have known that their child was at risk of
delinquency, and thus provides a clear standard for determin-

73. People v. Peabody, 119 Cal. Rptr. 780, 786 (Ct. App. 1975). In Peabody,
the court overturned a mother·s conviction for being criminally negligent for leaving her child with her husband whom she knew beat the child. The court held
that in order to constitute criminal negligence there must be a showing of gross
conduct. [d.
74. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 513.
75. [d. See also People v. Penny, 285 P.2d 926 (Cal. 1955) where the court
defined criminal negligence as "aggravated, culpable, gross, or reckless, that is . . .
such a departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinarily prudent or
careful person under the same circumstances as to demonstrate . . . an indifference to the consequences." [d.
76. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 513-14. The court found that the criminal negligence
standard in regard to the breach of duty provided notice to law-abiding parents
that was consistent with and reinforced the notice provided by the amendment's
incorporation of the definition and limits of the tort duty of parental supervision
and control. [d.
77. [d. at 514 (citing People v. Rodriguez, 8 Cal. Rptr. 863 (Ct. App. 1960»
(mother's conviction for leaving her child in a house that burned down while she
was at a bar drinking was reversed for lack of proof of criminal negligence).
78. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 514 (citing People v. Rodriguez, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 863)
(emphasis added). Under the criminal negligence test, knowledge of the risk is
determined by an objective standard. [d.
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ing what conduct is prohibited. 79
2.

Enforcement

Under the "void-for-vagueness doctrine," the amendment
must also provide standards for application and adjudication to
avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. so The Garcetti court stated that the enforcement requirement was the
more important aspect of the doctrine of vagueness. S1 The reason for its importance was that "where the legislature fails to
provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit a standardless sweep that allows policemen, prosecutors,
and juries to pursue their personal predilections."s2 The potential for such arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement is the
basis for the courts emphasis on the enforcement prong of the
vagueness doctrine. s3
The court stated that the amendment did not vest complete discretion in law enforcement officials because the
amendment incorporated the preexisting tort law definition of
parental duty.84 In addition, the court found that application
of the criminal negligence standard facilitated enforcement and
adjudication by providing a measure which assessed a parent's knowledge of, or authority over, a child's delinquent
activities. s5 A parent who does not know or have reason to
know of their child's delinquency cannot be prosecuted.s6

79. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 514.
80. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 108-09 (1972) (holding that an anti·
noise ordinance prohibiting a person while on grounds adjacent to a building in
which a school is in session from wilfully making a noise or diversion that dis·
turbs the peace of the school session is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad).
Id.
81. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 515 (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 358 (1983».
82. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 515 (citing Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358).
83. Id.
84. Id. The court found that the tort duty would supply police, prosecutors,
and juries with sufficient guidance and minimize the danger of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. Id.
85. Id. The court stated that although the criminal negligence standard does
not proscribe parental conduct with specificity it still provides a measure for en·
forcement. Id.
86. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 515.
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The court found that the causation element of section 272
also reduced the likelihood of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. 87 Under section 272 "a parent will be criminally
liable only when his or her criminal negligence with regard to
the duty of reasonable supervision and control causes or tends
to cause or encourage the child to come within the provisions
of Welfare and Institutions Code sections 601 or 602."88 The
court stated that there may be some instances in which reasonable minds could differ as to whether the parent's inadequate supervision caused the child's delinquency, but reasoned that the same causation question has always been an
element of parental tort liability.89 Additionally, the court
found that the opportunity for parental diversion from criminal
prosecution under section 272 suggested that, as a practical
matter, parents will only face criminal prosecution in extreme
cases. 90 The court concluded that the amendment, as construed, did not impermissibly delegate arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement power to law enforcement agencies. 91
Thus, the amendment survived the vagueness challenge.
B.

OVERBREADTH

An overbreadth challenge implicates the constitutional
interest in "due process.,,92 The overbreadth doctrine provides
that "a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved
by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms.,,93 Thus, a clear and

87. [d. Under Penal Code § 272 a parent will be criminally liable only when
their conduct "causes or tends to cause or encourage" the child to come within the
provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code § 601 or § 602. CAL. PENAL CODE §
272 (West Supp. 1995).
88. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 515; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West Supp.
1995); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 601, 602 (West 1984 & Supp. 1995).
89. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 515. The court noted that the causation element may
be harder to apply when a parent·s action does not directly cause delinquency,
such as when a parent is an accomplice, but the court found that causation has
always been an element of parental tort liability. [d.
90. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 515.
91. [d.
92. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; see also CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a), 24.
93. NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964) (holding that a statute
which requires a foreign corporation to provide member lists substantially re-
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specific law may still be unconstitutionally overbroad if it
infringes upon constitutionally protected conduct. 94
An overbreadth challenge, however, is difficult to sustain
because courts require a showing of substantial overbreadth. 95
Consequently, to justify a conclusion of facial overbreadth, the
plaintiff must be able to demonstrate from the text of the statute, and from its actual application, that there exists a substantial number of instances in which the statute cannot be
applied constitutionally.96 The United States Supreme Court
has held that application of the overbreadth doctrine is "manifestly strong medicine."97 Overbreadth is applied by the court
only as a last resort. 98
Analyzing the ACLU's overbreadth challenge,99 the court
first recognized the existence of a fundamental right to raise
one's children. 100 The court determined, however, that the
ACLU's overbreadth argument lacked the particularity necessary to meet the requirements of substantial overbreadth. 101
The overbreadth challenge as presented by the ACLU consisted
only of "brief and general assertions of the amendment's limitless reach. ,,102 The court concluded that if in fact any overstrained the NAACP's right to freedom of association).
94. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (holding that an
anti-noise ordinance was not unconstitutionally overbroad because expressive activity was only prohibited if it materially disrupted class work).
95. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-15 (1973) (holding that a
statute prohibiting employee8 from actively engaging in partisan political activities
among their coworkers for the benefit of their superior was not substantially
overbroad because the worker's conduct fell squarely within activities which the
state has power to regulate).
96. See New York State Club Ass'n v. New York City, 487 U.S. 1 (1988)
(where the United States Supreme Court declined to strike down a statute which
altered the definition of private clubs for anti-discrimination purposes because the
plaintiff did not show that a substantial number of instances existed in which the
statute could not be applied constitutionally).
97. Broadrick, 601 U.S. at 613. Overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have
been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be
applied to protected conduct. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940).
98. Broadrick, 601 U.S. at 613.
99. Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507, 516 (Cal. 1993).
100. [d. (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925».
101. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 516.
102. [d. at 516-17.
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breadth did exist, it could be cured through case-by-case analysis. l03 Thus, the California Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal, affirmed the judgment of the trial
court, upheld the validity of Penal Code section 272.104
V. CONCLUSION
In an attempt to curb youth violence and crime, the California legislature amended Penal Code section 272 so that
parents could be criminally liable for failing to exercise reasonable supervision and control over their children. l05 The California Court of Appeal held that the amended section 272 was
unconstitutionally vague. 106 In Williams v. Garcetti, the California Supreme Court unanimously held that the amendment
to Penal Code section 272 was not unconstitutionally vague because it incorporated the traditional definitions of tort law and
criminal negligence. 107 The court further held that the
ACLU's challenge lacked the particularity necessary to meet a
claim of substantial overbreadth. lOS

Catherine Clements'

103. Id at 517.
104. Id.
105. S.B. 1555, 97th Cong., Reg. Sess. § 186.20 (1988). See also CAL. PENAL
CODE § 272 (West Supp. 1995) (as amended).
106. Williams v. Reiner, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 472 (Ct. App. 1991), rev'd sub nom.
Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993).
107. Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507, 517 (Cal. 1993). See also CAL. PENAL
CODE § 272 (West Supp. 1995) (as amended).
108. Garcetti, 853 P.2d at 517. See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West Supp.
1995) (as amended).
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